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ESSAY
Against Methodological Stare Decisis
EVAN J. CRIDDLE* & GLEN STASZEWSKI**
Should federal courts give stare decisis effect to statutory interpretation
methodology? Although a growing number of legal scholars have answered this
question in the affirmative, this Essay makes the case against methodological
stare decisis. Drawing on recent empirical studies of Congress’s expectations
regarding statutory interpretation, we show that existing knowledge of Congress’s expectations is insufficient to settle on one consistent approach to
statutory interpretation. Moreover, Congress has almost certainly changed its
expectations over time, and this raises serious problems for methodological
stare decisis from the perspective of faithful-agency theories. We argue further
that many theories and doctrines of statutory interpretation are based on
constitutional norms and other public values that do not depend on Congress’s
meta-intent. Constitutional norms and public values also change, and interpretive methodology should remain dynamic so that the law can be responsive to
changing societal norms. Finally, we argue that the value of extending stare
decisis effect to interpretive methodology is unproven. Although treating prior
methodological decisions as binding precedent could, in theory, promote the
policies underlying stare decisis, the same would be true of extending that
doctrine to virtually any rules. Yet interpretive methodology is different from
first-order rules of law in significant ways, and freezing higher-order legal rules
into place would pose special and perhaps overwhelming difficulties. We therefore conclude that federal courts should not extend stare decisis effect to
methodological decisions without seriously grappling with these difficulties and
demanding much stronger evidence that such a move would improve the
operation of our legal system.
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INTRODUCTION
Two of the most interesting and important developments in recent scholarship
on statutory interpretation are calls to give stare decisis effect to interpretive
methodology and empirical efforts to ascertain Congress’s expectations regarding the interpretation of its work.1 The implication of the former trend is that
continuing to debate the same old questions about statutory interpretation in
case after case is a waste of time and resources,2 and that we should end the
“interpretation wars” that have raged in the federal courts for more than a
quarter century with the declaration of a “truce.” In other words, federal courts
should pick one approach to statutory interpretation and stick with it. Meanwhile, a clear lesson of the empirical work on Congress’s expectations for
statutory interpretation is that we still do not know very much about this topic,
and that what we have learned from these valuable studies is merely a snapshot
in time.
The thesis of this Essay is that these two strands in the literature are in
tension, and that the recent empirical work on Congress’s expectations for
statutory interpretation helps to highlight why giving stare decisis effect to
interpretive methodology would be a bad idea.3 We begin by describing the
two strands in the literature and explaining why giving stare decisis effect to
interpretive methodology would be undesirable if Congress’s meta-intent on
1. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1846–61 (2010); see also Abbe R.
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013).
2. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 1767 (claiming that “[t]hese debates are no longer useful,” and that the
failure to settle on a consistent and predictable approach to statutory interpretation “wastes court and
litigant resources; deprives Congress of an incentive to coordinate its behavior with the Court’s
interpretive methods; retains rather than eliminates another source of intracourt disagreement; and
makes the Court appear result-oriented, because the governing principles change from case to case”).
3. This Essay evaluates the possibility of giving stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology in
statutory interpretation. We do not address whether methodological stare decisis would be a good idea
in other areas such as constitutional interpretation. Cf. Chad M. Oldfather, Interpretive Methodology,
Stare Decisis, and the Constitution (July 22, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). We
believe, however, that some of our arguments would have relevance for that debate.
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such questions matters.4 Specifically, even if Congress has a coherent set of
collective expectations regarding statutory interpretation (which we question),
our existing knowledge of Congress’s expectations is insufficient for federal
courts to settle on one consistent approach to statutory interpretation if their
goal is to serve as a “faithful agent” of the legislature. Moreover, Congress has
almost certainly changed its expectations over time, and it would therefore be
highly problematic to apply today’s interpretive regime to statutes passed at
different times. In short, it would be impossible at this time for federal courts to
tailor their interpretive methodologies to the expectations of different congresses, and it would be undemocratic from a faithful-agency perspective for
federal courts to impose today’s preferred interpretive regime (even assuming,
contrary to reality, that one exists) on statutes enacted in different eras.5 Thus,
under the traditional view of statutory interpretation,6 the application of stare
decisis effect to interpretive methodology should be rejected.
We proceed to explain that many theories and doctrines of statutory interpretation are based on constitutional norms and other public values that arguably
should be respected regardless of Congress’s meta-intent. Constitutional norms
and public values also change, and interpretive methodology should remain
dynamic so that the law can be responsive to changing societal norms.
Finally, we argue that the value of extending stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology is unproven. Although treating prior methodological decisions as binding precedent could in theory promote the policies underlying
stare decisis (i.e., predictability, legitimacy, and efficiency), the same would be
true of extending that doctrine to virtually any rules. Yet interpretive methodology is different from other rules of law in some significant ways, and freezing
interpretive methodology into place would pose special and perhaps overwhelm-

4. By Congress’s “meta-intent,” we are referring to Congress’s general intentions, expectations, or
preferences regarding how its statutes are interpreted. Cf. Stephen F. Ross, Statutory Interpretation as a
Parasitic Endeavor, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1027, 1036 (2007) (describing Congress’s meta-intent as
reflecting “an empirical claim about the general expectation of legislators”). We recognize that these
concepts are subtly different, and it is not entirely clear which of them Gluck and Bressman have
sought to capture, but these subtle differences are irrelevant for purposes of our analysis.
5. In this Essay, we take no position on whether it would be wise for Congress to impose a
comprehensive regime for federal statutory interpretation. Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (offering such a proposal).
6. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5
(2001) (“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as Congress’s
faithful agents.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System,
98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (claiming that as “honest agents of the political branches,” courts “carry
out decisions they do not make”). Although faithful-agent theory is widely accepted, we do not take a
position in this Essay on the normative question of whether courts should necessarily follow this
approach. It also bears noting that Gluck and Bressman question the viability of faithful-agent theory
in the second installment of their project. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory
Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the
Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). The tension we identify in this Essay would, of
course, be most acute or problematic for someone who affirmatively embraces both faithful-agent
theory and methodological stare decisis.
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ing difficulties. We therefore conclude that federal courts should not extend
stare decisis effect to methodological decisions without seriously grappling
with these difficulties and demanding much stronger evidence that such a move
would improve the operation of our legal system. Although we doubt that the
application of stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology will ever be a
good idea, we are certain that it is not a good idea today.
I. RECENT PROPOSALS TO GIVE STARE DECISIS EFFECT TO
INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY
A prominent theme in recent scholarship on statutory interpretation is that
the federal judiciary’s current methodology is too complicated, inconsistent, and
unpredictable. This is largely the case because federal courts do not treat
interpretive methodology as a traditional form of “law,” and federal judges are
therefore permitted to use whichever interpretive methods they prefer to resolve
each particular case. For example, a judge may examine the legislative history
of a statute in case A, but decline to do so in case B. Similarly, a judge could
utilize a textualist methodology in case X, an intentionalist methodology in case
Y, and a purposive or dynamic approach in case Z. Not only are federal judges
freely permitted to vacillate among competing approaches to statutory interpretation in different cases, but they are not generally expected to explain
precisely why they have chosen to follow one approach rather than another in
any particular case. Scholars have increasingly criticized this state of affairs and
have offered proposals that would effectively require federal judges to follow a
consistent and uniform method of statutory interpretation.7
In this regard, the Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly in the substantive law context that “[s]tare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.”8 Justice Brandeis famously embraced this
policy “because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right.”9 Under the doctrine of stare decisis,
the Court must adhere to its own precedent unless there is a “special justification” for departing from a previous decision, and lower courts must strictly
follow the precedents of higher courts.10 Moreover, the conventional wisdom is
that prior interpretations of statutes by federal courts are entitled to a “superstrong presumption of correctness,” partly because Congress could amend a
statute to override an erroneous or outdated judicial decision.11 Despite wide-

7. See, e.g., Rosenkranz, supra note 5.
8. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
9. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
10. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1864 n.3 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988).
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spread support for the doctrine of stare decisis on substantive statutory issues,
federal courts generally do not give stare decisis effect to their methodological
decisions in statutory interpretation cases.12
Several scholars have argued, however, that “the doctrine of stare decisis is
tailor-made” to provide the consistency and predictability “that are notoriously
lacking in statutory interpretation doctrine,”13 and they have therefore claimed
that federal courts should give stare decisis effect to methodological decisions.14
Thus, Sydney Foster has argued that this course of action would provide the
same benefits that are provided by the application of stare decisis to substantive
decisions, and that giving stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology would
serve a valuable coordinating function that is largely unnecessary in the substantive-law context.15 Accordingly, Foster claims that courts should give even
stronger stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology than is provided to
substantive decisions.16 Similarly, Professor Abbe Gluck has argued that “settling on a consistent approach is a worthy goal for statutory interpreters.”17
Based on her examination of the experiences of several states,18 Gluck claims
that “judges can and do bind other judges’ methodological choices, in the same
way they bind one another with respect to substantive preferences.”19 Both
Foster and Gluck point out that the judiciary gives stare decisis effect to
interpretive methodology in various other contexts, and they contend that rules
of statutory interpretation should not be treated any differently.20
One of the most fascinating aspects of Professor Gluck’s work on this topic is
her observation that the legal status of interpretive methodology remains unresolved.21 She has focused on this question primarily in the context of the Erie
problem and other situations where courts in one jurisdiction must interpret
12. See Foster, supra note 10, at 1866, 1872–84; Philip P. Frickey, Interpretive-Regime Change,
38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1971, 1976 (2005) (noting that the Supreme Court’s use of one statutory
interpretation theory rather than another in a particular case is not binding on the Supreme Court or
even on lower courts in subsequent cases); Gluck, supra note 1, at 1765–66; Jonathan R. Siegel, The
Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 385–86
(2005).
13. Foster, supra note 10, at 1866.
14. See infra notes 15–20 and accompanying text; see also Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating
Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 681 (2008).
15. See Foster, supra note 10, at 1886–97.
16. See id. at 1867–69.
17. Gluck, supra note 1, at 1848; see also id. at 1846–61 (offering a normative defense of consistent
approaches to statutory interpretation generally).
18. See id. at 1771–1811 (providing case studies of several states that have adopted “controlling
interpretive frameworks” and given their methodological decisions stare decisis effect).
19. Id. at 1823.
20. See Foster, supra note 10, at 1900–01 (pointing out that certain rules of contract interpretation,
evidence law, and constitutional interpretation are given stare decisis effect); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898,
1968–90 (2011) (providing various examples of legal methodologies that are treated as “more lawlike
than statutory interpretation” for purposes of the Erie doctrine).
21. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 1750.
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statutes adopted by the legislature of another jurisdiction.22 The case law on
these questions is unsettled, but the few scholars who have begun to address this
question appear to agree that interpretive methodology is a form of “law,” and
that the traditional hierarchy of legal sources can be used to identify a canon’s
legal status.23 The traditional hierarchy of legal sources maintains, in turn, that
binding law in a constitutional democracy must stem from the Constitution,
validly enacted statutes, or the common law (in that order of authority)—and
that there is not a viable fourth alternative. Gluck and Foster therefore seem to
assume that interpretive methodology should generally be viewed as a judicially
created form of common law, and they argue that it should be given stare decisis
effect just like most other common law judicial decisions.24
II. RECENT EMPIRICAL WORK ON CONGRESS’S META-INTENT
Alongside these arguments for methodological stare decisis, scholars have
begun to explore empirically whether the judiciary’s traditional tools for statutory interpretation are consistent with Congress’s preferred interpretive methodology.25 In the latest and arguably most comprehensive study, Gluck teamed
with Professor Lisa Bressman to conduct detailed interviews with 137 congressional counsels—the staff members who advise federal legislators on draft

22. See generally Gluck, supra note 20.
23. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 444–47 & n.23 (2012) (recognizing that interpretive techniques
may be required or prohibited by the Constitution, but concluding that the vast majority of interpretive
choices “are essentially matters of common law in the sense that they could be changed by either courts
or legislatures”); Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 2092–2140 (developing an elaborate framework for
assessing the constitutional status of interpretive techniques, but concluding that the vast majority of
interpretive principles are judicially-created common law that could permissibly be displaced by a
duly-enacted statute); see also infra note 24.
24. See Foster, supra note 10, at 1868–69 (claiming that “statutory interpretation doctrines can be
classified according to whether they are derived from a statute, the common law, or the Constitution,”
and arguing that the Court should give doctrines of statutory interpretation stronger stare decisis effect
than the substantive decisions emanating from each of the respective legal sources); Gluck, supra
note 20, at 1907, 1912–17 (arguing that “as a matter of both doctrine and theory, there are compelling
reasons to reconceptualize federal statutory interpretation methodology as law,” and drawing an
analogy to “federal common law”); Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 775–77 (2013) (exploring the possibility
that interpretive methodology is a form of judge-made common law); Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and
the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 344 (2010) (claiming that canons of statutory
interpretation “are nothing more than common law”). We take no position here on whether statutory
interpretation should be understood as a form of common law.
Unlike Foster, who would accord “extra-strong” precedential weight to statutory interpretation
methodology, Foster, supra note 10, at 1868, Gluck suggests that methodological rules “might occupy a
place on that spectrum of law, perhaps meriting lower precedential weight in order to give judges the
ability to evolve interpretive doctrine over time and respond to changes in the legislative process.”
Gluck, supra note 20, at 1917–18.
25. See, e.g., Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1; Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with
Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation,
54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002).
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legislation. Gluck and Bressman spoke with congressional counsels from both
houses, including a near-equal balance of Democrats and Republicans.26 In the
course of their survey, Gluck and Bressman pursued two primary lines of
inquiry. First, they sought to determine how much congressional counsels know
about the tools federal judges use to interpret statutes. Second, they asked
congressional counsels what interpretive approaches they use regularly when
drafting and interpreting federal legislation. By comparing judicial and congressional interpretive approaches in this manner, the authors endeavored to discover the extent to which congressional counsels and judges agree on the proper
methodology for interpreting federal legislation.
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the Gluck–Bressman survey offers
a mixed account of the congruence between judicial and congressional statutory
interpretation. On some issues, Gluck and Bressman found considerable convergence. For example, among the congressional counsels surveyed, 82% were
aware of the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to federal
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes in a variety of settings.27 Most respondents reported that they used Chevron routinely in statutory
interpretation.28 Some judicial canons of statutory interpretation were unfamiliar to most congressional counsels, yet the canons closely matched the respondents’ own preferred approach to statutory interpretation. For example, although
most respondents “did not know the canon [of constitutional avoidance] by
name, 69% . . . said that that their expectations about how the courts would rule
on the constitutionality of statutes played a significant role in the drafting
process.”29 These and other findings of the Gluck–Bressman study suggest that
some traditional judicial approaches to statutory interpretation track, or at least
closely approximate, the methodological choices that congressional counsels
favor in statutory interpretation.
In other areas, however, Gluck and Bressman uncovered marked divergences
between judicial and congressional statutory interpretation. For example, the
rule of lenity, which provides that ambiguous criminal statutes should be
interpreted narrowly in favor of the defendant, was only known by name by
35% of the sixty-five respondents who had participated in drafting criminal
legislation.30 Respondents indicated that some other canons such as the rule
against superfluities were familiar but “rarely” or “only sometimes” apply.31
Perhaps most striking, and in direct conflict with the views of some judges and
legal scholars, congressional counsels from both parties overwhelmingly emphasized the importance of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Indeed,

26. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 905–06, 920–21.
27. Id. at 994; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(articulating the eponymous doctrine of judicial deference).
28. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 994.
29. Id. at 948.
30. Id. at 946.
31. Id. at 934.
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respondents rated legislative history as the most important interpretive tool
other than the text itself, trumping judicial canons of statutory interpretation.32
To the extent that the views of congressional counsels may be understood to
reflect Congress’s preferred interpretive method, these findings of the Gluck–
Bressman study may offer important lessons for judges who aspire to serve as
faithful agents of Congress in statutory interpretation.
Yet despite its significant informational value and novel insights, the Gluck–
Bressman study is unlikely to constitute the last word on congressional statutory
interpretation. Framed as a guide to “congressional drafting” practice, the
study’s value is compromised by the fact that it focuses primarily on congressional counsels, who (by the authors’ own admission) do not ordinarily take the
lead in drafting statutory text.33 This work is typically performed by attorneys in
the nonpartisan Office of Legislative Counsel (OLC), and they do not appear to
employ the same interpretive methodology as congressional counsel.34 On the
contrary, Gluck and Bressman emphasize the disconnect between “the professional, non-partisan drafters in the offices of Legislative Counsel who focus on
text and court cases,” and “the other staff—and elected members—who create
the policy and make the deals, but often do not draft text and are not as focused
on the courts.”35 To be sure, congressional counsels do participate in the
drafting of statutory text, and they generally take the lead in composing
legislative history.36 Even when congressional counsels do not serve as the lead
authors of legislation, they often shape the language of draft legislation as it
moves from the drafting table through subsequent stages of the legislative
process. Without doubt, congressional counsels’ interpretations of draft legislation also inform the voting decisions of the legislators whom they serve. All the
same, once we acknowledge the polyphonic character of the legislative process,
which includes not only the voices of congressional counsels, but also those of
congressional committees, individual legislators (who may rely more on committee reports and “conceptual” documents than statutory text37), nonpartisan OLC

32. Id. at 975.
33. Id. at 968.
34. Id.; see also Gluck & Bressman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 6–24) (describing “the immense
variety and fragmentation of types of staff involved in the legislative process and their different goals
and drafting practices,” as well as “the common disconnect between staffers who draft statutory text
and staffers who craft the policy that underlies it (and the related disconnect between text and
legislative history drafters)”).
35. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10). Interestingly, however, Gluck and Bressman also found that contrary to the expectations of other staffers and some scholars, “the Legislative
Counsels [they] interviewed had no greater knowledge of most of the canons than the other respondents.” Id. at 17. Aside from their limited knowledge, Bressman and Gluck also observed that
Legislative Counsels “do[] not appear to have the reach, the convening power or even the consistency
of practice, to coordinate Congress’s drafting process.” Id. at 18.
36. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 968. It should perhaps come as no surprise, therefore, that
congressional counsel overwhelmingly consider legislative history to be the most important tool in
statutory interpretation. Id. at 975.
37. Id. at 968–69.
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drafters, and many others, it is difficult to escape the feeling that the perennial
“search for an author” in debates over statutory interpretation cannot be so
easily resolved.38 Indeed, there is compelling evidence that members of Congress
sometimes deliberately inject ambiguity into statutes to facilitate compromise
and enable legislators with sharply divergent views to plausibly declare victory.39 Thus, although the Gluck–Bressman study is deeply illuminating, its
limited scope and the diverse responses of congressional counsels simply
underscore the confounding complexity of efforts to pinpoint Congress’s collective preferences for statutory interpretation.40
This is not to suggest that there is little to be gained from empirical work on
congressional drafting practices. The empirical turn in statutory interpretation
scholarship is a welcome development to the extent that it has the potential to
advance theories about the legislative process beyond mere intuition and conjecture into the realm of verifiable hypotheses. The Gluck–Bressman study
illustrates the rich insights that may be gleaned from engagement with the real
world of congressional practice. The study’s findings are particularly important
because they provide a new point of entry into long-standing debates over
Congress’s expectations for judicial statutory interpretation. For example, the
Gluck–Bressman study lends ballast to some controversial judicial techniques
that are based on Congress’s alleged meta-intent, including the Chevron and
Mead doctrines from federal administrative law.41 If judges and executivebranch officers seek to serve as faithful agents of Congress, they cannot
reasonably ignore such empirical findings—even if they share our doubts about
whether Congress has a coherent, unitary meta-intent that can be fully captured
by such studies.42 As future empirical studies build upon the pioneering work of
Professors Gluck and Bressman, the complex dynamics of congressional statutory interpretation are likely to come into sharper focus over time.
III. PROBLEMS WITH STARE DECISIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
FAITHFUL-AGENCY THEORY
The rise of empirical legal scholarship poses a problem for advocates of
methodological stare decisis because it unsettles many of the assumptions on

38. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 27–28) (contrasting the divergent approaches and perspectives of different participants within the legislative drafting process).
39. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 25, at 628–33 (providing an example from the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
40. Scholars have, of course, previously identified similar problems with the notion that Congress
has a single, collective intent on many substantive issues that could be reliably ascertained by the
judiciary. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
41. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 906–07, 995–1003.
42. Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation,
97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2014 (2011) (arguing that by ignoring evidence of congressional interpretive
practices, critics of the Chevron doctrine have given themselves “license to disregard the role of
congressional delegation in evaluating how to allocate interpretive authority between courts and
agencies”).
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which their arguments may be thought to rest. The leading theories of statutory
interpretation tend to accept the view that federal judges should ordinarily serve
as faithful agents of Congress when interpreting federal legislation.43 Under
faithful-agency models of statutory interpretation, the argument for methodological stare decisis is strongest if Congress’s meta-intent is either static and readily
ascertainable, or dynamic but predictably responsive to judicial guidance. As
the Gluck–Bressman study demonstrates, however, the real world of congressional practice does not conform to either of these ideal models. As one might
expect, Congress’s preferences regarding statutory interpretation do appear to
evolve appreciably over time. But these preferences are not consistently responsive to judicial nudging. Thus, attempts to use stare decisis to lock in a general
interpretive regime for federal legislation are likely to be counterproductive
from a faithful-agency perspective.
Consider first the proposition that Congress’s meta-intent is static and readily
ascertainable. We have alluded already to the challenges associated with efforts to ascertain a collective legislative intent for interpretive methodology,
given the multiplicity of participants and the absence of a uniform process for
legislative drafting.44 But even if we accept the assumption that the survey
responses of congressional counsels illuminate Congress’s collective intent,
other difficulties remain. For example, what should faithful-agent judges do if
congressional counsels disagree about the value of particular interpretive tools,
as the Gluck–Bressman study suggests is nearly always the case? Should they
accept the views of a bare majority of congressional counsels (51%) as an
authoritative expression of Congress’s collective meta-intent?45 Or should they
apply stare decisis only to interpretive methods that are supported by an
overwhelming supermajority of congressional counsels? Might judges represent
Congress more faithfully if they employ an eclectic approach that takes into
account all of the diverse methodological approaches employed by congressional counsels? Or would courts best represent the diverse constituencies
within Congress if individual judges and justices remain free to follow their
own diverse methodological preferences? These questions do not yield straight43. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text; see also Foster, supra note 10, at 1888–89
(proposing methodological stare decisis as a response to coordination problems between Congress and
the courts); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 913 (observing that the two leading schools of
statutory interpretation, “purposivism and textualism, both claim consistency with a ‘faithful-agent’
vision of the judicial role”). As noted above, Gluck and Bressman question faithful-agency approaches
to statutory interpretation on various grounds in the second installment of their empirical study. See
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 7).
44. See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 25, at 583 (“Our responses indicate quite strongly that there
is no uniform process of legislative drafting followed in all cases. . . . [C]ourts and commentators
should treat simple factual generalizations about congressional drafting with greater skepticism.”);
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 924
(2003) (“In the United States . . . there is no centralized drafting body . . . . The drafters of legislation
are multiple and uncoordinated.”).
45. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 938 (“More than 50% of our respondents said that
dictionaries are never or rarely used when drafting.”).
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forward answers because the concept of collective congressional intent is not
straightforward. As long as members of Congress and their staff are unable to
reach consensus on a single favored regime for statutory interpretation, reasonable judges will continue to debate what it means for the courts to serve as
Congress’s faithful agent. It is therefore important to keep in mind that the
Gluck–Bressman study does not establish the existence of a single, widely
accepted interpretive regime within Congress. Nor is there any other evidence
that a uniform interpretive regime of this nature exists.
Even if courts could readily ascertain Congress’s preferred approach to
statutory interpretation, there is little evidence that Congress’s preferences are
stable over time. If Congress’s preferences were relatively static, then faithfulagency theory would arguably support using stare decisis to bind the courts to
Congress’s meta-intent prospectively, while also providing a consistent, predictable interpretive baseline for the executive branch and the public. Although the
Gluck–Bressman study offers a detailed snapshot of congressional counsel
preferences during a narrow five-month window in 2011–2012, it hazards no
claims about the intertemporal dynamism of congressional statutory interpretation. Even so, the Gluck–Bressman study offers significant grounds for skepticism about the possibility that Congress’s meta-intent might be sufficiently
static to serve as the basis for a regime of methodological stare decisis. Many
congressional counsels reported that they were aware of developments in
judicial practice and had adjusted their own expectations in the drafting process
accordingly. For example, substantial percentages of congressional counsel
were familiar with and regularly used judicial canons of statutory interpretation
such as the federalism and preemption canons—interpretive conventions that
courts have developed within the previous three decades.46 We strongly suspect
that the high level of support that congressional counsels expressed for Chevron
deference is also a relatively recent phenomenon. But even if judicial practice
has not changed meaningfully over time,47 it would be surprising if congressional practice has remained constant. Projecting into the future, Gluck and
Bressman observe that “[c]anons that are unknown today may [become familiar] canons that affect congressional drafting ten years from now, if legal
education has something to do with it.”48 With continuous turnover in the
membership of Congress and congressional staff, one would hardly be surprised
to find that Congress’s methodology for legislative drafting has shifted, and will
continue to shift, measurably over time.

46. See id. at 942–44 (discussing federalism and preemption canons).
47. Studies suggest that judicial approaches to statutory interpretation have evolved considerably
over time. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2005) (finding that “the [Supreme] Court’s reliance on both
language canons and substantive canons in its majority opinions [between 1969 and 2003] has virtually
doubled from the Burger to the Rehnquist eras, even as the Court’s reliance on legislative history has
steadily declined” (footnotes omitted)).
48. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 1022.
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At what point in time should courts, as faithful agents, set statutory interpretation methodology in the cement of methodological stare decisis? Applying stare
decisis at any particular moment has the potential to place judicial practice in
tension with the drafting practices of past and future Congresses. This problem
of dynamic congressional preferences is analogous to Derek Parfit’s allegory of
a young Russian nobleman who declares his intention “to give [his] land to the
peasants.”49 Concerned that the fire of his socialist ideals might burn less
brightly later in life, Parfit’s Russian nobleman:
signs a legal document, which will automatically give away the land, and
which can be revoked only with his wife’s consent. He then says to his wife,
“Promise me that, if I ever change my mind, and ask you to revoke this
document, you will not consent.” He adds, “I regard my ideals as essential to
me. If I lose these ideals, I want you to think that I cease to exist. I want you
to regard your husband then, not as me, the man who asks you for this
promise, but only as a corrupted later self. Promise me that you would not do
what he asks.”50

If the wife makes this promise, what should she do if her husband later changes
his mind and seeks her consent to revoke the document? Should the wife honor
her promise? Or should she defer to her husband’s present intentions and revoke
the document?
Some might argue that the Russian nobleman’s wife ought to keep her
promise to the youthful husband. But this view would offend the principle,
enshrined in agency law, that “the person to whom we are committed can
always release us.”51 Indeed, as Deborah DeMott has observed, the fiduciary
duties that the Russian nobleman’s wife, as agent, owes to her husband would
require her to act always in a manner that is “consistent with her understanding
of her principal’s present statement of intentions. Although his preferences have
changed, the principal’s identity [is the same,] and his wife is the Russian
nobleman’s representative.”52 By the same token, courts that seek to serve as
faithful agents of Congress may not allow stare decisis to hinder them from
applying Congress’s evolving interpretive preferences to contemporaneous legislation—even if this may undermine the consistency and predictability of federal
statutory interpretation to some extent.53
One possible response to the Russian nobleman problem would be for courts
to give stare decisis effect to the interpretive methodology that Congress
49. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 327 (1984).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 328.
52. Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds.) (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 25).
53. Whether concerns for faithful agency are trumped by other public norms is a separate question,
which we will take up in Part IV.
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favored at the time a particular statute was enacted. After all, each two-year
term brings a new Congress, which may not share the statutory interpretation
preferences of its predecessor when it enacts new legislation. This approach,
however, would require a familiarity with Congress’s dynamic preferences that
far exceeds the scope of current empirical knowledge and lies well outside the
scope of judicial competence. Even if scholars could agree on the best empirical
methodology for identifying Congress’s preferred approach to statutory interpretation, constant monitoring would be required to document the state of these
preferences at the time Congress enacts new legislation. These difficulties
would only be compounded by the fact that most major legislation is amended
over time by different Congresses, and it would be virtually impossible for
courts to track the divergent interpretive preferences of different legislative
bodies when they interpret different provisions of the same statute. Even if it
were possible for the judiciary to obtain the requisite information about the
meta-intent of the relevant Congress, such a fine-grained approach to methodological stare decisis would likely render the doctrine of limited practical value
in advancing predictability, efficiency, and stability across time. It therefore
seems impossible to satisfy the goals of both faithful-agency theory and methodological stare decisis simultaneously.
Another response to the problem of Congress’s dynamic preferences is the
idea that courts need not adhere slavishly to Congress’s present preferences
because their own methodological choices may be expected to shape Congress’s
drafting practices prospectively. If Congress uses the judiciary’s interpretive
methodology as a default backstop for its own legislative drafting, a strong
argument can be made from principles of legislative supremacy that judges
should use stare decisis to make their interpretive methodology as clear and
consistent as possible. In theory, this approach could make it easier for Congress to anticipate how courts will respond to its drafting choices, facilitating a
more harmonious working relationship between Congress and the courts.54
Although this argument for methodological stare decisis might be appealing
in the abstract, the empirical record suggests that judicial decisions do not
consistently produce “feedback loops” that facilitate cooperative dialogue between Congress and the courts. According to Gluck and Bressman, congressional counsels are wholly ignorant or only dimly aware of a variety of
important canons. For example, Gluck and Bressman found almost no evidence
of a feedback loop for clear statement rules such as the presumption against
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.55 In fact, “only six

54. See Foster, supra note 10, at 1887 (“[B]y clarifying the background rules against which
Congress is legislating, interpretive regimes aid in effectuating congressional intent.”); cf. WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 277 (1994) (“As an agent of the legislature, the Court
does its job best when it comes up with a transparent interpretive regime—a coherent and clear set of
textual and substantive canons—for that allows legislators to coordinate their bargaining activities and
predict the application of their statutes most easily.”).
55. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 945.
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respondents (4% of 137)” were able to identify correctly any clear statement
rule applied by courts.56 Perhaps even more startling, only a small minority of
respondents who participate in drafting criminal legislation were familiar with
the rule of lenity, one the oldest judicial canons of statutory interpretation.57
Such findings suggest that judicial canons of statutory interpretation—even
those that have been employed for centuries—do not necessarily represent a
common baseline for judicial and congressional statutory interpretation. The
resulting fissure between Congress and the courts becomes, in Bill Eskridge’s
words, “a serious indictment” of judicial practice from a faithful-agency
perspective.58
Needless to say, the agency problems associated with untethered judicial
interpretive methodology are even more troubling in contexts where the courts
employ interpretive canons that Congress affirmatively rejects. Gluck and Bressman characterize the rule against superfluities, the presumption of consistent
usage, and reliance on dictionary definitions as “rejected canons” because a
majority of their survey respondents reportedly did not use these interpretive
methodologies regularly when drafting statutes.59 Given how rarely Congress
overrides judicial statutory interpretation,60 the continued use of these rejected
canons raises particularly serious democratic-legitimacy concerns.
Advocates of methodological stare decisis might respond that these apparent
agency problems do not negate the appeal of methodological stare decisis; they
simply remind us that courts should take care to use interpretive tools that are
consistent with congressional preferences. Yet this response fails to comprehend
the depth of the problem. We cannot go back in time to recover the meta-intent
of past congresses whose work is still the primary focus of today’s interpretive
litigation. Moreover, even after the Gluck–Bressman study, it is remarkable
how little we know about current congressional preferences for statutory interpretation. Further enlightenment about congressional preferences is likely to
arrive only gradually as the empirical turn in statutory interpretation scholarship
gains momentum. Yet future empirical studies will require continuous reassessment in light of Congress’s evolving attitudes and practices. And courts as
faithful agents likewise will have to adjust their methodologies over time in
response to developments in Congress. Perhaps most troubling, the Gluck–
Bressman study suggests that Congress is “uninterested in coordinating with
courts,” and is in any case currently “too fragmented” in its approach to
statutory interpretation “to do so without some radical changes.”61 This shifting
terrain is hardly promising ground on which to construct a doctrine of method-

56. Id.
57. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
58. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531,
538 (2013) (book review).
59. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 933–40.
60. Id. at 912 n.14 (citing empirical studies).
61. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 10).
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ological stare decisis.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH STARE DECISIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
OTHER PUBLIC NORMS
The difficulties associated with methodological stare decisis are not merely
products of faithful-agency theory. Although Bressman and Gluck focus primarily on Congress’s expectations regarding statutory interpretation, they correctly recognize that some canons of statutory interpretation are best justified
on normative grounds that do not depend upon (and may, in fact, contradict)
Congress’s meta-intent. This is true of relatively specific canons of statutory
interpretation, as well as foundational theories. To the extent that these methods
of judicial statutory interpretation are based on constitutional norms or other
public values, courts should allow their methods to change once it is apparent
that the public values upon which they rest have changed, and courts should
generally retain the flexibility to decide which interpretive methodology will
best promote the relevant constitutional norms and public values in any particular case.
Federal courts frequently employ substantive canons of statutory interpretation to promote constitutional norms and other public values that tend to be
underenforced for institutional reasons during the process of judicial review.
These canons do not derive their authority from congressional intent. For
example, the rule of lenity is widely understood to promote constitutional norms
of fair notice and nondelegation, which may well be justified even if a tough-oncrime legislature rejects this particular canon.62 Similarly, the avoidance canon,
which provides that courts should interpret statutes to avoid serious constitutional doubts when fairly possible, is widely understood to prevent Congress
from pushing the constitutional envelope unless legislators have carefully considered the problem at issue, in addition to preserving the judiciary’s political
capital. Although this canon is frequently defended based on assumptions about
Congress’s intent, its validity is unlikely to depend on what any particular
Congress thinks about the matter.63 More broadly, some commentators have
argued that judicial reliance on legislative history to ascertain Congress’s intent
is unconstitutional,64 whereas others have argued that it would raise serious
constitutional difficulties for courts to refuse to consider legislative history
given a constitutional structure that is designed to promote reasoned delibera-

62. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 956–57 (recognizing that “drafter awareness actually
relates little to the purpose of the rule of lenity,” and that “the rule serves as a constitutional backstop
and is used by courts to interpret statutes in the light of concerns about due process and notice”).
63. See id. at 958 (“The constitutional avoidance rule seems of the same order as lenity, in terms of
its actual dependence on drafter awareness.”).
64. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 386–88 (2012) (claiming that using legislative history to ascertain what the legislature intended
“is not just wrong; it violates constitutional requirements of nondelegability, bicameralism, presidential
participation, and the supremacy of judicial interpretation in deciding the case presented”).
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tion by elected representatives.65 If either of these arguments is correct, then
Congress’s expectations regarding the judiciary’s use of legislative history are
largely irrelevant. Finally, the foundational theories of statutory interpretation,
which include textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism, are all thought to
promote particular visions of the Constitution.66 Indeed, Justice Scalia has
argued that central aspects of his version of textualism, which seeks to ascertain
what the law as enacted meant, are constitutionally required.67 If he is correct,
then it is irrelevant that “no one [in Congress] uses a freaking dictionary,”68 or
that members are often unfamiliar with the statutory text.69
The prevailing views of the best methods of statutory interpretation have
changed over time in response to evolving views of the Constitution and other
public values. The conventional wisdom is that early American courts purported to follow the legislature’s intent, but they generally eschewed dogmatic
reliance on grand theories in favor of a relatively eclectic approach.70 It is also
widely accepted that federal courts generally followed the tenets of legal
process theory from the time of the New Deal until approximately the late
1960s.71 In more recent years, we have witnessed the rise (and alleged fall) of
the new textualism in statutory interpretation,72 and the alleged emergence of a
“new purposivism.”73 In addition, the federal judiciary has responded to shifting
constitutional norms and other public values over time by recognizing new
substantive canons,74 or by deploying old substantive canons in new ways,75
65. See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and
the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1998).
66. See Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction,
120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 52 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/7/30/leib_serota.html (recognizing
that “the conventional schools of statutory interpretation are all based on legitimate constitutional
values and highlight different normative concerns regarding the relationship between the judiciary, the
legislature, and society”).
67. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 64, at 345 (“[T]he very nature of the constitution requires the
judges to follow the letter of the law.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT
OF LAWS, bk. VI, at 75 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1748))); id. at 397–98
(claiming that “[t]he traditional view is that an enacted text is itself the law,” and “that it ‘demean[s] the
constitutionally prescribed method of legislating to suppose that its elaborate apparatus for deliberation
on, amending, and approving a text is just a way to create some evidence about the law, while the real
source of legal rules is the mental processes of legislators’” (quoting In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344
(7th Cir. 1989))).
68. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 938 (quoting a survey respondent).
69. See id.
70. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 691 (4th ed. 2007).
71. See id. at 721–22.
72. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006).
73. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113.
74. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
75. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611–45 (1992) (describing and
criticizing the emergence of super-strong clear statement rules during the Rehnquist Court); Cass R.
Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law, 32 ENVT’L. L. REP. 11,126 (2002).
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based on prevailing understandings of the Constitution and the development of
the modern regulatory state. The most comprehensive empirical study of the
Supreme Court’s use of canons of statutory interpretation explicitly recognized
“the uncertain weight and cyclical fashionability of certain substantive canons.”76 Each of these shifts in judicial methodology was inspired by federal
courts’ evolving views of the Constitution and related public values.
If prevailing attitudes about the theories and doctrines of statutory interpretation have changed in the past based on evolving constitutional norms and public
values, chances are that they will continue to evolve in unpredictable ways in
the future. Indeed, one of the conclusions that Gluck and Bressman draw from
their survey of congressional drafting practices is that federal courts have
focused on the wrong constitutional norms and public values when developing
methodologies for statutory interpretation. Given the lack of empirical support
for faithful-agency theories of statutory interpretation, Gluck and Bressman
suggest that courts should consider abandoning the search for congressional
intent and instead focus on constructing a rule-of-law model that would be more
compatible with the real-world dynamics of congressional and judicial practice.
This model would focus on “facilitating systemic coordination, predictability or
coherence,” and seek to “pragmatically effectuate the broad goals of the statute
rather than specific legislative understandings.”77 By establishing clear interpretive baselines, the theory goes, federal courts could promote consistency and
predictability in statutory interpretation across all three branches of government.78 Thus, Gluck and Bressman’s recommendation for a rule-of-law approach to statutory interpretation perfectly illustrates how the legal community’s
evolving views of constitutional norms and other public values may lead to new
approaches to statutory interpretation.79

76. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 47, at 111; see also id. at 106–07 (recognizing that “the Court
does not thoroughly engage the major aspects of a new congressional regulatory scheme until a decade
or more has passed following enactment,” and “there is the risk that legislators who debate and approve
that scheme simply cannot foresee how the Court’s substantive canon priorities are likely to evolve in
the longer term”).
77. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 5).
78. Id. (manuscript at 60) (arguing that a rule-of-law model may provide the “common language”
that “is necessary for the branches to interact”). Gluck and Bressman concede that “current doctrine
does not perform that function,” and they caution that the model’s potential cannot be realized without a
good faith commitment from all three branches. Id. (manuscript at 36).
79. Aside from these general contours, it is not entirely clear what the rule-of-law model that Gluck
and Bressman envision would entail. To the extent that this approach to statutory interpretation would
include methodological stare decisis, several fundamental questions would need to be answered to give
(dare we say) “substantive content” to the underlying theory. For example, which rules of statutory
interpretation should prevail? And, why should they be treated as binding precedent? Surely, the answer
to these questions cannot be solely a function of “first in time, first in right.” In the absence of
persuasive answers to these questions, the rule-of-law approach would essentially boil down to a call to
have (interpretive) rules, for the sake of having (interpretive) rules. Moreover, any serious effort to give
substantive content to the binding rules of a rule-of-law regime would likely reproduce the very same
interpretive wars that have already been raging for the past quarter century. A rule-of-law approach
therefore strikes us as a nonstarter as a foundational theory of statutory interpretation unless its
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Constitutional norms and other public values also influence how judges
decide particular statutory cases in a more direct manner. This is true of the
rule-of-law model, which encourages judges to consider which interpretive
methods will best promote cooperation among the three branches and advance
other important public values. It is also true under pragmatic theories of statutory interpretation, which openly consider evolving public norms and contemporary policy considerations to help resolve statutory ambiguities.80 The insights of hermeneutics suggest that even textualist approaches inevitably take
public values into account because the interpreter must always apply her own
interpretive horizon to the historical text under consideration.81
Reasonable minds may disagree about whether, or in what way, constitutional norms and other public values are relevant to judicial statutory interpretation. It is not our intention to resolve those debates here. Our point is simply
that if public values are relevant to statutory interpretation, interpretive methodology should remain dynamic so that it can respond effectively to our society’s
evolving understanding of those values and their application to public institutions. Accordingly, it would be a serious mistake for courts to declare one
approach to statutory interpretation—or one set of canons—as “the winner” and
freeze that approach into place through the application of stare decisis.
V. THE UNPROVEN VALUE OF STARE DECISIS
The arguments for giving stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology are
superficially appealing because the principles of statutory interpretation seem
like judicially-created common law,82 and the policies underlying stare decisis
would seemingly be served by extending the doctrine to this area.83 In particular, if courts were to treat their methodological decisions as binding precedent in
future cases, there could eventually be a single set of uniform rules of statutory
interpretation for the federal courts. A single set of uniform rules would, in
theory, promote consistency and help ensure that like cases were treated alike.

proponents can provide persuasive answers to these questions, as well as to the related difficulties that
would arise from giving stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology, which are described in Part V
of this Essay.
80. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
81. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609
(1990).
82. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
83. Some scholars have questioned whether the application of stare decisis to interpretive methodology would provide the intended benefits. They point out that courts could manipulate most binding
methodological frameworks to achieve their preferred outcomes, and that methodological stare decisis
would therefore merely be likely to undermine judicial candor and drive disagreement underground.
See Eskridge, supra note 58, at 540–51 (claiming that Scalia and Garner’s proposed canonical approach
would not eliminate unpredictability or judicial policymaking from statutory interpretation, and describing “the constant temptation to fudge”); Leib & Serota, supra note 66, at 58–62. While we find these
criticisms persuasive, our argument in this Part is that a regime of methodological stare decisis would
be misguided even (or perhaps especially) if it worked as intended.
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Federal litigation would be more efficient and less expensive because litigants
and judges would no longer need to debate the niceties of statutory interpretation. The prevailing consensus would also promote legitimacy (or its appearance) because courts would no longer debate the appropriate interpretive methods
or send mixed signals about the proper approach for deciding statutory cases.
Upon closer examination, however, the fact that extending stare decisis to
statutory interpretation methodology would plausibly advance the doctrine’s
purposes is not particularly impressive. The advantages of stare decisis could be
achieved, at least in the short run, by the adoption of virtually any set of
plausible rules.84 At the same time, interpretive methodology is different from
substantive rules of law in several fundamental ways, and it would be severely
problematic for federal courts to attempt to freeze interpretive rules into place
by applying stare decisis. A persuasive case for methodological stare decisis
would therefore need to attend to the differences between interpretive methodology and other legal rules, as well as to the negative consequences that would
result from giving methodological decisions stare decisis effect.
While a complete discussion of the relevant differences between substantive
rules of law and interpretive methodology would undoubtedly require a much
longer article, a simple catalogue of some of the most fundamental differences
should suffice for our purposes, particularly since the advocates of methodological stare decisis have not seriously grappled with any of the resulting difficulties. The most basic distinction that underlies our analysis is between what some
scholars have identified as first-order, or primary, rules of legal conduct and
second-order or third-order legal rules, which are “rules about rules” or “rules
about rules about rules” respectively.85 While substantive law is composed
primarily of first-order legal rules (e.g., no dogs allowed), interpretive methodology is composed primarily of second-order legal rules (e.g., interpret the statute
by ascertaining the plain meaning of its text) and third-order legal rules (e.g.,
defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory text). This distinction, like any attempt to capture the essential differences between substance and procedure, may be slippery at the margins.
Nonetheless, it reflects a key difference between substantive rules and interpretive methodology that has important implications for the viability of a
stare decisis regime.

84. We suspect that blatantly illegitimate rules for resolving statutory disputes would lack the
stability necessary to provide a viable regime of binding precedent and that stare decisis is unnecessary
to enforce principles on which there is already widespread consensus. Accordingly, the rules of
statutory interpretation that were adopted pursuant to a regime of stare decisis would presumably need
to be plausible candidates among the various competing options. See Oldfather, supra note 3, at 13 (“It
is only where there is, or has been, some question as to the appropriateness—and thus acceptance—of a
legal rule that precedent comes into play.”). There is no shortage of theories or canons of statutory
interpretation that fall within those parameters.
85. For an illuminating discussion of this distinction, see Jean Hampton, Democracy and the Rule of
Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE OF LAW 13, 13–44 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
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How is interpretive methodology materially different from substantive rules?
First, the rules of statutory interpretation have much higher stakes than substantive rules of law because interpretive rules are used to resolve disputes about the
permissible application of countless statutes from across the entire policy
landscape. One reason the interpretive wars have been so intense is that the
operative rules of statutory interpretation play an extremely important role in
defining the scope of many substantive statutory provisions. Although substantive decisions involving first-order legal rules such as those involving the
Second Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Clean Air Act may have a
major impact, they do not necessarily spill over into other areas of law. If courts
were to give methodological decisions stare decisis effect in statutory interpretation cases, however, those decisions would control every subsequent statutory dispute.86 Thus, for example, if the Supreme Court held that legislative
history was henceforth off-limits, it would be off-limits in every subsequent
case. Similarly, if the Court held that its decisions would henceforth be governed by the principles articulated in Judge Frank Easterbrook’s scholarship,87
such a decision would have profound implications for every statutory dispute.
Accordingly, when a bare majority of the Michigan Supreme Court purports to
establish textualism as the only valid method of interpreting statutes within the
state,88 it is a big deal—and a much larger power grab vis-à-vis the future court
and the state legislature than when that court engages in judicial activism to
make any particular substantive decision.
Second, interpretive methods substantially influence judicial reasoning and
decision making in ways that would severely complicate the viability of a
regime of stare decisis. It is one thing for courts to establish a substantive rule
on a particular topic and require that judges apply the rule in subsequent cases

86. Cf. Oldfather, supra note 3, at 33–34 (claiming that the application of stare decisis to methodological decisions could not be contained within workable bounds because all cases of statutory interpretation or constitutional interpretation share the relevant similarities). Although it is possible to imagine an
approach in which courts would apply stare decisis more narrowly—for example, to foster methodological uniformity for a single statute or a single field of law—this would only lessen our concerns. See
Gluck & Bressman, supra note 6 (manuscript at 70) (identifying a movement toward tailoring
interpretive doctrine in various ways, and claiming that “these individual moves” may be “part of a
trend toward a set of even more tailored interpretive principles organized around subject matters or
individual statutory schemes”). This approach would not eliminate the spillover/heightened stakes
problem, and all of the remaining difficulties that are described below would remain. Accordingly,
while we are not opposed to the idea of tailoring interpretive doctrine toward particular subjects or
statutory schemes, we are not persuaded that the relevant interpretive techniques should necessarily be
given stare decisis effect. Indeed, as we explained above, when the rules become more varied, complex,
and nuanced, the benefits that could be derived from a regime of methodological stare decisis are
severely diminished. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 53–54. This is illustrated by the Court’s
deference doctrine in administrative law, which is not applied in a remotely consistent fashion in
practice. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083 (2008).
87. See Rosenkranz, supra note 5, at 2087 (providing this example).
88. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 1803–11 (describing the recent textualist “revolution” in Michigan).

2014]

AGAINST METHODOLOGICAL STARE DECISIS

1593

under the doctrine of stare decisis, even if they would not agree with the rule as
a matter of first impression. It is quite another thing, however, for courts to
establish a binding interpretive methodology for a particular jurisdiction and
hold that other judges are bound by that “rule about rules” in subsequent cases
by the doctrine of stare decisis, even if it leads them to reach highly problematic
or absurd results in cases of first impression. Our legal traditions plainly
countenance the application of stare decisis in the former context, but federal
courts have sensibly declined to extend the doctrine to the latter situation. We
therefore agree with Bill Eskridge and Connor Raso that “statutory interpretation methodology does not seem susceptible to the rule-like approach of stare
decisis” because it is fundamentally “a web of considerations with different and
varying weights rather than a set of hierarchical rules.”89 We also share their
suspicion that federal courts will not let methodological constraints lead them
into making unreasonable legal or policy decisions, and that this creates a need
for continuing flexibility in deciding how to decide statutory cases.90
Third, methodological decisions are frequently intertwined with a judge’s
most fundamental beliefs and commitments about the rule of law and democracy,91 and the application of stare decisis to interpretive methodology would in
principle require judges to make what they view as unconscionable decisions.
Once again, it is one thing to require judges to follow binding substantive rules
with which they disagree, but it is another thing to require judges to follow
higher-order rules that force them to make decisions on issues of first impression in a manner that is contrary to their fundamental understanding of the
role of federal courts in a constitutional democracy. It is hard to believe, for
example, that Justice Scalia would agree to decide every future statutory case
that comes before the Court in a purposive fashion merely because Justice
Breyer was able to persuade a five-Justice majority to adopt this approach in the
first case decided under a regime of methodological stare decisis. Nor would we
blame Justice Scalia for his principled resistance, even if we might prefer
Justice Breyer’s purposivism to Justice Scalia’s textualism.
Fourth, methodological decisions do not generally implicate reliance interests
as strongly or directly as substantive legal decisions. Partly because most rules
would provide the predictability, efficiency, stability, and perceived legitimacy
that are promoted by stare decisis, the strength of the doctrine frequently

89. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1811
(2010).
90. See id. at 1815–17 (claiming that proposals to establish a uniform set of binding interpretive rules are “unlikely to succeed” because norms necessarily play an important role in statutory
interpretation).
91. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1686–87 (1988)
(claiming that “[a]ny theory of statutory interpretation is at base a theory about constitutional law,”
which “must at the very least assume a set of legitimate institutional roles and legitimate institutional
procedures that inform interpretation”); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 593–94 (1995).
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depends in practice upon the degree of reliance that has been engendered, or
will be promoted, by a precedent. While reliance interests are particularly strong
when it comes to rules of property, contracts, and other means of facilitating
private transactions, the legitimate reliance interests underlying most principles
of statutory interpretation are relatively weak or nonexistent. For starters,
federal courts have never given stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology.
Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that Congress frequently puts interpretive considerations on the back burner to get statutes enacted.92 Indeed, most
people (including many judges) do not care very much about statutory interpretation methodology, and they place much greater value on substance than procedure.93 To the extent that private citizens or public officials could legitimately
rely on judicial consideration of certain information, such as the plain meaning
of the text or the reasoned views of administrative agencies, those expectations
tend to be reflected in existing legal doctrine. This is not to say that courts never
upset the legitimate reliance interests of lawmakers or citizens. For example, the
Gluck–Bressman study suggests that the Supreme Court’s retroactive application of clear statement rules and textualists’ disdain for legislative history may
be particularly problematic from this perspective.94 The point is a relative one;
from the standpoint of reliance interests, the case for applying stare decisis is
generally much stronger for substantive rules of law than for principles of
statutory construction.
Finally, the flexibility that is provided by the current approach to statutory
interpretation, and the broad range of arguments that are available to litigants
and judges, provide affirmative benefits that improve the resolution of particular
cases and make our legal system more responsive. Ethan Leib and Michael
Serota have argued persuasively that the current menu of interpretive approaches “induces deliberative and transparent contestation” by forcing judges
to “work hard to find compromises, render the strongest argument utilizing all
credible sources available, and take seriously all types of arguments to achieve
the best result within the range of permissible interpretations.”95 Leib and
Serota recognize that the broader range of relevant considerations that are
brought into play by different theoretical perspectives “allows our legal system
to absorb a mix of the values underlying various interpretive approaches that
might not otherwise be produced in a unified interpretive regime.”96 They
predict that the adoption of a uniform method of statutory interpretation would
drive disagreement underground, and they point out that there is no single
approach that would be appropriate for the full range of legislative products,
which includes common law statutes, criminal statutes, super-statutes, omnibus
legislation, successful ballot initiatives, public-interested legislation, and narrow
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 25, at 615; Raso & Eskridge, supra note 89, at 1809.
See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 89, at 1810.
See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 1, at 945, 975.
Leib & Serota, supra note 66, at 49.
Id.

2014]

AGAINST METHODOLOGICAL STARE DECISIS

1595

rent-seeking deals.97 For many of the same reasons, we believe that the existing
approach to statutory interpretation affirmatively promotes republican democracy and a normatively attractive vision of the rule of law.98 Adopting any
single binding approach would therefore be fundamentally misguided.
We certainly do not intend for this brief catalogue of the relevant differences between interpretive methodology and substantive rules of law to be the
last word on the subject. Nor do we mean to suggest that judicial decisions
addressing interpretive methodology will never merit stare decisis effect. There
may be great value, for example, in using stare decisis to protect the reliance
interests that are generated by the core aspects of third-order legal rules such as
Chevron and Mead—rules which allocate interpretive authority between courts
and agencies.99 Our point is simply that applying stare decisis to interpretive
methodology writ large would raise serious and potentially overwhelming
difficulties that cannot be lightly disregarded or ignored. Federal courts should
therefore not extend stare decisis effect to methodological decisions without
seriously grappling with these difficulties and demanding much stronger evidence that such a move would improve the operation of our legal system.
CONCLUSION
Recent calls for methodological stare decisis have a superficially seductive
appeal. Proponents claim that giving stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology would advance rule-of-law values by enhancing the consistency and
predictability of federal adjudication; it would advance democratic values by
strengthening dialogue between Congress and the courts; and it would bolster
federal courts’ legitimacy by putting an end to the interpretation wars that have
divided federal judges, invited academic criticism, and undermined public
confidence in the federal courts.
In this Essay, we have argued that federal courts should resist the siren song
of methodological stare decisis and allow the interpretation wars to continue.
Although some level of consistency and predictability may be desirable in
statutory interpretation, and we welcome recent efforts to clarify Congress’s
drafting practices, applying methodological stare decisis would likely do more
harm than good. In particular, we are skeptical that the recent empirical turn in
legal scholarship will resolve debates over Congress’s intentions, expectations,
or preferences as the “faithful principal” in the legislative process. Nor would it
be wise to use stare decisis to freeze any particular Congress’s interpretive

97. See id. at 53–58, 61–62.
98. See generally Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation As Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 221 (2013) (outlining and defending this vision).
99. See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 89, at 1811 (arguing that “the case for stare decisis is especially
strong for the core Chevron proposition that when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to an
agency, judges are required to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation, unless Congress has
resolved the issue in the statute”).
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preferences into place when these preferences are sure to change over time.
Arguments for methodological stare decisis also pay insufficient heed to the fact
that statutory interpretation is shaped by normative principles, which can, will,
and should continue to evolve over time. We therefore believe that it would be a
serious mistake to give stare decisis effect to interpretive methodology—both
now and, likely, forever.

